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Rosetta Stone Ltd. respectfully· submits this opposition to Google Inc.'s motion for 
summary judgment. For the reasons that fullow, Google's motion should be denied and Rosetta 
Stone's motion for partial summary judgment as to liability should be granted. 
INTRODUCTION 
[n its motion for partial summary judgment, filed on March 26, 2010, Rosetta Stone 
established that it is entitled to summary judgment as to liability because there are no genuine 
issues of material fact as to Google's violations of the Lanham Act and Virginia law. (Dkt. Nos. 
103-110.) In particular, Rosetta Stone established that Google (i) is directly liable for trademark 
infringement because Ooogle uses the Rosetta Stone Marks' in '. manner that is likely to confuse 
- and in fact has confused - consumers and (ii) is liable for the trademark infringement of its 
customers because it intentionally induces its customers to infringe the Rosetta Stone Marks, 
continues to sell Sponsored Links to entities that it knows are engaging in trademark 
infringement, and has the legal right and practiCal ability to stop the infringing conduct yet fails 
to do so. Rosetta Stone also established th~t Google is liable for trademark dilution because its 
conduct has resulted in the blurring and tamishmelit of the Rosetta Stone Marks. Finally, 
Rosetta Stone established that Google has been unjustly enriched because it knowingly uses and 
sells the Rosetta Stone Marks for its own profit without compensating Rosetta Stone. ."- ~ . ." 
In seeking summary judgment in its favor, Google mischaracterizes Rosetta Stone's 
position, asserting that Rosetta Stone challenges all uses of the Rosetta Stone Marks on Google's 
website. (Dkt. 118, Google Mem. at 1-2.) From this faulty premise, Google claims that Rosetta 
Stone's intent is to "deprive consumers of the ability to efficiently comparison shop for language 
products, find the best prices for Rosetta Stone products, easily locate product reviews, and 
The "Rosetta Stone Marks" include ROSETTA STONE, ROSE1TA STONE LANGUAGE 
LEARNING SUCCESS, ROSETI ASTONE.COM and ROSE1TA WORLD. 
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explore other competitive products." (Jd at 2.) Rosetta Stone intends no such thing, and as 
Ooogle points out in its motion, Rosetta Stone's CEO plainly stated at his deposition that there 
are numerous legitimate and pennissible uses of the Rosetta Stone Marks. (See id. at I.) 
What is impermissible - and what Rosetta Stone seeks to stop - is Google's unauthorized 
use and sale of the Rosetta Stone Marks as keywords that trigger third-party, Sponsored Links on 
Google search-results pages. Although Google seeks to cloak itself in decados of case law, not a 
single one of the cases cited by Google (including the opinion by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes 
with which Google opens its brief) involved a defendant selling the use of another company's 
trademark. 
As discussed herein" contrary to Goog!c·s portrayal of itself as a mere "publisher" of 
advertisements, Google (i) encourages its eustomers to bid on trademarked terms so that their 
Sponsored Links appear when a user searches for the trademarks terms; (ii) encourages its 
customers to use the trademarked tenns in their Sponsored Link text to increase the likelihood 
that a user will click on the Sponsored Link; and (iii) reaps a profit every time a user clicks on a 
Sponsored Link. Google's use of the Rosetta Stone Marks in this manner has confused 
consumers, diluted the Rosetta Stone Marks and diverted Rosetta Stone's customers to 
competitors and counterfeiters. As such, Google's conduct violates the Lanham Act and 
Virginia law. 
In arguing otherwise, Google asks this Court to ignore (i) its own involvement in the 
Sponsored Link campaigns of its customers; (ii) what is actually happening on Google's website 
every day; (iii) Googlo's own internal studies that ""neluded that the use of a trademark in ad 
text results in a "high" likelihood of consumer confusion; (iv) the testimony of five college-
educated consumers who were so confused by Google's Sponsored Links that they unknowingly 
2 
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purchased counterfeit Rosetta Stone software; and (v) the fact that Google profits every time a 
Google user "clicks" on any Sponsored Link that appears when a user queries a Rosetta Stone 
Mark. In fact, the cornerstone of Google's motion is its unsupported assertion that "[i]fany ads 
are lawful, it necessarily follows that Google's policy as a whole cannot violate the Jaw." 
(Google Mern. at 13 .) Even if Google were 'correct in its absurd assertion that a single lawful ad 
renders its policies immune from challenge, the question presented in this case is whether 
Goagle's practices violate the law. As demonstrated-.in Rosetta Stone's motion for summary 
judgment and below, they do. GoogIe's motion for summary judgment should be denied. 
STATEMENT OF DISPUTED FACTS 
3. DiSJlllted. Although Google publicly states that its goal is to provide users with 
Sponsored Links that are "relevant" to its users' search queries, internal Google documents 
demonstrate that Google's purpose in selling Sponsored Links and allowing customers to use 
trademarks in Sponsored Link text is to increase Google's revenue. (Exs.I -3'/ 
4. Disputed. Google's own documents show that many consumers are unable to 
distinguish between Sponsored Links and organic results. (Exs. 4-8.) 
5. Disputed. Googlc is involved in the selection of keywords by its customers, 
which includes suggesting keywords to its customers. Documents available on Goegle's website 
provide specific guidance to customers regarding the selection of keywords. (Exs. 9-12.) 
Internal Google documents provide guidance to Google employees regarding optimization of its 
customers ' AdWords accounts. (Exs. 13-14.) And internal Google communications reflect 
efforts by Google employees to assist their clients in optimizing their AdWords accounts through 
2 Unless otherwise noted, exhibit references herein are to the exhibits attached to the 
Declaration of Jennifer L. Spaziano in Opposition to Google's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Its Motion to Exclude Expert Report and Opinion of Dr. Kent Van Liere. 
J 
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the selection of keywords. (Ex. 15.) The "filters" utilized by Google in the keyword selection 
process, while automated, are fraught with inaccuracies and subject to a manual review. (Exs. 
16-19.) 
8. Disputed. As a legal matter, for all the reasons discussed in Rosetta Stone's 
summary judgment motion and below, Gaagle is responsible for the infringing conduct of its 
customers. As a fa9tuaI matter, numerous Goagle documents demo"nstrate that Google assists ITs 
customers in developing the content of such Sponsored Links and ultimately controls the content 
of those Sponsored Links. (Exs. 20-23 & Ex. 24 at 10.) 
II. Disputed. Google's 2009 trademark policy changed in response to concerns 
raised at Google with respect to disappointing financial results. (Exs. 3, 25-26.) The 
"technological tool" developed by Google, moreover, is fraught with inaccuracies and 
consistently approves Sponsored Links that link to landing pages that violate Google's own 
policies. (Ex. 27; DkL 106, CalhounDecl. "4-6 & Exs. B-D.) 
13. Disauted. Although Rosena Stone cannot confirm that a product is counterfeit 
without physically inspecting it, it would be fairly easy for Google to determine whether one of 
its customers. is or is likely selling counterfeit Rosetta Stone prodUCts. In this regard, Sponsored 
Links for counterfeit software typically (il offer Rosetta Stone product at a fraction of its price; 
and (ii) display ad text and URLs that contain the phrase "Rosetta Stone" or a variation of one of 
the Rosetta Stone Marks; and (iii) direct the user to a landing" page that mimics Rosetta Stone's 
own webpage. (Calhoun Dec!. ~ 2 & Exs. B-D.) Google's Trust & Safety Manager identified 
some of these very factors, as well as several others, as indicators of counterfeit product. (Ex. 65, 
Louie Dep. at 25:16-26:20.) In any event, Rosetta Stone regularly advises Google of counterfeit 
Sponsored Links and the URLs used by the counterfeiters. (Calhoun Dec!. ml4-6 & Exs. 8-D.) 
4 
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14. Disputed. The Google employees responsible for enforcing its trademark and 
anti-counterfeiting policies also have responsibilities that are far broader than trying to enforce 
the trademark policies at issue in this litigation and responding to trademark complaints. (Dkt. 
114, Louie Decl. ~~ 3-5.) 
15. Disputed. It frequently takes days, and ·sometimes weeks, .for Google to respond 
to notices of counterfeit Sponsored Links on its AdWords program and there have been many 
instances where Google has taken no action with respect to AdWords v.iolations. (See Calhoun 
Dec!. 1J'!J 2-10 & Exs. B-D.) Moreover, even when Google told Rosetta Stone that it took down 
Sponsored Links that had been identified as infringing, Google subsequently displayed on its 
search-results pages the same Sponsored Links or other Sponsored Links from the same 
counterfeiter. (Id ,/8 & Exs. B-D; see also Section n.A, i'1fra.) 
16. Disputed. The resources that Google spends in attempting to combat 
counterfeiters is negligible when compared (0 the revenue that Google generates from its 
AdWords program. In this regard, as of December 31, 2009, Google had 19,835 employees, yet 
it devoted just ISO man hours per week - less than four employees - to "dealing with 
counterfeiting." (Ex. 24 at 18.) These 150 man. hours are spread across six mtemal Google 
teams, each of which is responsible for a variety of tasks. (Dk!. 114; Louie Dec!. W 3-5.) 
17. Disputed. See Paragraph 15. 
19. Rosetta Stone does not dispute that certain Google employees, including most 
specifically its sales representath;es whose job was to foster the relationship with Rosetta Stone 
and encourage Rosetta Stone to spend more money on Sponsored Links, from time to time,. were 
helpful in taking down infringing Sponsored Links. Such Google employees, however, were not 
5 
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always successful in doing so and Google documents demonstrate that other individuals at 
Google rejected Rosetta Stone's requests to remove infringing Sponsored Links. (Exs. 28·3l.) 
29. Disputed. As a threshold matter, Rosetta Stone earns more money per dollar with 
respect to direct-email marketing than it does buying Sponsored Links on Google. (Ex. 63, 
Leigh Dep. at 263:6-15; Ex. 56, Garvey Dep. at 78:20--79:22) More fundamentally, the sales 
generated from the purchase of Sponsored Links are based not only on the money that Rosetta 
Stone pays to Google, but also on every dollar that Rosetta Stone spends on television, print, 
radio and kiosk advertising. In this regard, one significant goal of all Rosetta Stone's advertising 
is to drive ·consumers to Rosetta Stone's webpage. (Ex. 55, Eichmann Dep. at 4&:13--49:21.) 
Accordingly, it is not accurate to look just at tho "amount Rosetta Stone pays Google to determine 
the profitability of Rosetta Stone's Sponsored Links. (Ex. 54, Duehring Dep. at 6&:2·10; Ex. 55, 
Eichmann Dep. at 119: 19-224: 13.)' 
ARGUMENT 
Sununary judgment should only be gnmted when a party bearing the burden at trial fails 
to make a showing sufficient to establish an essential element of the case~ Cefolu Corp. v. 
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986), such that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. p, 56(c). In 
determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the Court must view all facts in the 
light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 
(1986). Summary judgment will not be granted wben a reasonable jury could return a verdict for 
the nonmoving party on the evidence presented. [d. at 247·48. A!J discussed below, far from 
Rosetta Stone does not agree with Google's characterization of the facts set forth in 
paragraphs 1,2,6,7,9, 10, 12, 18,20--28 and 30, but does not dispute {hem for purposes of 
this motion. The purported feets set furth in paragraphs 18,20,21,26,27 and 30, moreover, 
are not relevant to the issues presented in this case. 
6 
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providing a basis for "granting summary jUdgment in favor of Google, the record evidence 
demonstrates that Rosetta Slone is entitled to summary judgment as to liability. 
I. ROSETTA STONE HAS PROVED DIRECT TRADEMARK LIABILITY 
To prove a claim for direct infringement, Rosetta Stone must demonstrate that (I) it 
possesses the Rosetta Stone Marks; (2) Google used the Rosetta Stone Marks; (3) Google's use 
of the Marks occurred in conuneree; (4) Gcogle used the Marks in connection with the s.le, 
offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of goods and services; and (5) Gcogle used the 
Marks in a mOnner likely t6 confuse customers. 15 V.S.C §§ 1114; PETA v. Doughney, 263 
F.3d 359, 364 (4th Cir. 2001). As set forth in Rosetta Stone's motion for partial summary 
judgment, Rosetta Stone has done so. (DkI. 104, Rosetta Stone Mem. at 16-24.) Nothing in 
Googlc's motion for summary judgment compels a different conclusion_ 
A. Google Does Not Dispute That The First Four Elements or A Trademark 
Infringement Claim Are Met 
Although it is Google's hurden in seeking summary judgment to demonstrate that Rosett. 
Stone cannot prove an essential element of its case, Google does not once identify the elements 
of a trademark infringement claim. (Google Mem. at 8-23.) Instead, Google dissects its 
trademark policies. asserting that the Court ftrst should ccnsider whether the usc of the Rosetta 
Stone Marks to refer to the company or its products is actionable, then assess whether keyword 
bidding infringes the Rosetta Stone Marks. and finally determine whether the usc ofthe Rosetta 
Stone Marks in Sponsored Link text constitutes infringement. In presenting its argument in this 
fashion, Google attempts to obfuscate its practices. In this regard, Google does not restrict its 
sale of the Rosetta Stone Marks to customers that are referring to Rosetta Stone or its products -
it allows anyone to bid on the Rosetta Stone Marks and to have their Sponsored Links displayed 
when a user queries a Rosetta Stone Mark. (Dkt 117. Lloyd Dec!. Ex. I.) Likewise, although 
7 
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• 
Google's trademark policy purports to restrict .the actual use of the Rosetta Stone Marks in 
Sponsored Link text to customers that are referring to Rosett. Stone or genuine Rosetta Stone 
products, in pr~ctice, Google conducts negligible diligence and regularly allows counterfeiters to 
display Sponsored Links thut use the Rosetta Stone Marks in their text. (Calhoun Dec!. ~, 2.9; 
Rosetta Stone Mem .• t 7 (UF 19).) Moreover, bec.use Google allows .customers to use the 
Rosetta Stone Marks in Sponsored 'Links appearing on search-results pages displayed when a 
Rosetta Stone Mark is queried, Google~s practice of auctioning trade~arks as keywords cannot 
be separated from its practice of allowing customers to use trademarks in Sponsored Link text. 
Properly considered, these facts establish that (I) Google uses the Rosetta Stone Marks; 
(2) Google's use of the Marks occurs in commerCC; and (3) Google uses the Marks in connection 
with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of goods and services. See. e.g., 
Rescuecom Corp. v. Gaogle Inc., 562 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 20(9); Google, Inc. v. Am. Blind & 
Wal/paper, No . C 03-5340 IF (RS), 2007 WL 1159950 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18,2007); GEICO v. 
Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700 (E.D. Va. 2004)' 
B. Contrary To Google's Assertions, The Record Evidence Demonstrates That 
Google Uses The Rosetta Stone Marks In A Manner Likely To Confuse 
Consumers 
The only question remaining th,n is whether Google used the Rosetta Stone Marks in a 
manner li~ely to confuse consumers. See Rescuecom, 562 F.3d at 130-31 (stating that Lanham 
Act violation will lie if Google's use of trademark "in its AdWords program causes likelihood of 
confusion or mistake" and denying motion to dismiss where likelihood of confusion was 
• In the Statement of Uncontested Facts, filed on April 2, 2010, Google admitted that the 
Rosetta Stone Marks have been registered with the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office. (Dk!. 142 at ~ 3.) The first element of a trodemark infringement claim therefore also 
is undisputed. See Sweetwater Brewing Co., LLC v. Great Am. Restaurants, Inc., 266 F. 
Supp. 2d 457, 461-62 (E.D. Va. 2003); see also Dkt. 108, May Dec!. ~, 2·7 & Exs. 1·6. 
8 
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sufficientlyaUeged).· Although Google argues that Rosetta Stone cannot meet its burden to show 
that Google uses the Rosetta Stone Marks in a manner likely to confuse consumers (Google 
Mem. at 16- 18), the record evidence establishes confusion in several ways. 
First, confusion is presumed in cases, sucb as this one, involving counterfeit marks. See 
Phillip Morris U.S.A., Inc. Y. Sholabi, 352 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1073 (C.D. Cal. 2004) ("counterfeit 
marks arc inherently confusing"); Fila U.S.A., Inc. v. Kim, 884 F. Supp. 491, 494 (S.D. Fla. 1995) 
("Where a counterreit item is virtually identical to thc genuine item, the 'very purpose of the 
individuals marketing the . cheaper [counterfeit) items is to confuse the buying public into 
believing that it is buying the true article. "'); Gucei Am., Inc. v. Duty Free Apparel, 286 F. Supp. 
2d 284, 287 (S.D.N. Y. 2003) ("counterfeits, by their very nature; cause confusion"). 
Second. GoogJe's own studies, which Google omits to mention in its motion, 
demonstrated a high degree of consumer confusion when trademarks are used in Sponsored Link 
text. In particular, in connection with its 2004 policy change, Google conducted in-house 
exp~riments to analyze user confusion associated with trademark terms appearing in text. (Ex. 
32.) These experiments concluded that the use of trademark terms in either the body or the title 
ofa Sponsored Link resulted in a high likelihood of consumer confusion: 
• Preliminary resuits "indicate[d) that confusion remains high whcn TM's are 
allowed in thc body but not in the ad title. For a uscr, it secms to make little 
difference whether s/he sees a TM in the ad title or ad body - the likelihood of 
confusion remains high. Ths inference is also supported by qualitative/anecdotal 
data, i.e., responses by our subjects to open-ended questions asked at the end of 
the experiment. This suggests that the only effective TM policy for US/Canada is: 
(1) Allow TM usage for keywords (2) Do not allow TM usage in ad ten - title or 
body." (Ex. 33.) 
• "87.5% of users were confused at least once during Experiment 2, and 76% ofthe 
users were confused at least once during Experiment 4." (Ex. 34.) 
• ~'Overall very high rate of trademark confusion (30-40% on average per user) ... 
94% of users were confused at least once during the study." (Ex. 35.) 
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Because the use of trademarks in text had the potential to calise confusion, Google's 2004 
trademark policy change prohibited the use of Ira de marks in text. (Ex. 58, Hagan Dep. at 92:16-
23 & 93:[8-94:5; Ex. 59, Hagan Dep. at 90:12-91:5; Ex. 51, Chen Dep. at 209:4-1O.) Prior to 
implementing the 2009 trademark polipy change, Google did not conduct any new user studies or 
experiments with respect to confusion resulting from the use of a trademark in text or do 
anything else to determine whether its policy change would likely cause user confusion. (Ex. 60, 
Hagan Dep. at 80:13-[7; Ex. 5[, Chen Ocp. at 172:2-11 & 208:17-209:3.) Thus, Google 
implemented the 2009 trademark policy change with full knowledge that the likelihood of 
confusion remains "high." (Ex. 33.} 
Third, when shown a results page for a Goog[e search of "Rosetta Stone," Google's 
designated corporate representatives - its current and fonner Chief Trademark Counsel- could 
not tell that three of the Sponsored Links - two ads fur counterfeiters and one for a Rosetta Stone 
competitor - were not advertising the sale of genuine Rosetta Stone software. (Ex. 51, Chen Dcp. 
at 189:23-190: 19, 194:[-195:[5 & Ex. [2; Ex. 60, Hagan Dep. at 159:21-163:[ I & Ex. 7.) 
Fourth, five individual consumers have testified that they were confused by a Google 
Sponsored Link displayed on a Google search-results page when th~y conducted • search fur 
"Rosetta Stone," leading them to buy what they thought was genuine Rosetta Stone product but 
which, in fuel, was counterfeit software. (Ex. 52, Doyle Dep. at [ I: [5-14:6, 15:4-16:15 & 24:6-
II; Ex. 53, DuBow Dep. al 15:2-19:20,23:19-24:20,32:20-33:7 & 38:[8-43:10; Ex. 62, Jeffries 
Dep. at 13:5-14:1'1,20:2-21:2, 22:16-2[ & 24:18-26:2; Ex. 67, Porter Dep. at 12:22-36:21; Ex. 
69, Thomas Dep. at 12:4-l8:3, 19:12-20:7, 20:20-21:l6 & 22:3-7; Calhoun Decl. 1 Il.)' Google 
, Contrary to Google's assertion, all five individuals purchased counterfeit product. Although 
Diana Stanley Thomas could not loeate the software she purchased at the time of her 
deposition, she purchased the product from sourceplaza.com (Ex. 69, Thomas Dep. at 20:20-
(cont'd) 
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attempts to downplay the significance of this testimony. asserting that five ·confused customers is 
de minimis as a matter of law. (Google Mem. at 23.) This argument is baseless. See Sara Lee 
Corp. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 81 !'.3d 455, 467 (4th Cir. 1996) (f",ding likelihood of confusion 
where six women testified that they had purchased or, in one case, nearly purchased a "Leg 
Looks" product under the mistaken impression that it was a L'eggs prvduct'); see also X-It 
Prods., LLC v. Walter Kidde Portable Equip., Inc., 155 F. Supp. 2d 577, 623 (E.D. Va. 2001) 
(,,[eJven a few instances of actual confusion may be sufficient, taken by themselves, to cstabl.ish 
• likelihood of confusion' ') . 
In any event, although Rosetta Stone deposed only five individuals (the maximum 
number of non-expert/non·party depositions allowed by this Court), discovery in this case shows 
that many more individuals have been confused by Google Sponsored Links. For example, as 
set forth in Rosetta Slone~s interrogatory responses, its customer care center has received 
numerous complaints: from individuals who have purchased. counterfeit software believing the 
software to be genuine Rosetta Stone product, with a marked increase in the number of 
complaints during the period December 9, 2009 through March 8, 2010, when Rosetta Stone 
observed a proliferation of Sponsored Links to counterfeit sites. (Ex. 36 at 2-3.) In addition, 
Ros<;tta,Stone kiosk employees have reported that customers have requested that the kiOSK match 
the prices set forth in a web printout from a counterfeit site and that individuals have attempted" 
to return to the kiosks counterfeit software. (ld) Call center representatives also have reported 
(cont'd!rol11 previous page) 
22), the same website from which Denis Doyle purchased his counterfeit software (Ex. 52, 
Doyle Dep. at 16,6-8). Moreover, although Steve DuBow could not confinn at his 
deposhion where the link from which he purchased counterfeit software appeared, his 
records show that he purchased the software on October 6, 2009 from bossdisk.com (Ex. 53, 
DuBow Ex. 2), a Sponsored Link that Rosetla Stone complained to Google about on October 
6, 2009 (Ex. 43 at GOOG-RS-031 0697). 
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that individuals have raised questions about Rosett. Stone's pricing as a result of information 
they have gathered through the internet. (Jd) And, individuals who purchased genuine Rosetta 
Stone software from Amazon.com have attempted to return the software to Rosetta Stone under 
the six-month guarantee that is available only when the product is purchased directly from 
Rosetta Stone. (Jd) Thus, Rosetta Stone has proffered not only the testiroony of five credible 
witnesses, it also has presented anecdotal evidence of numerous other examples of actual 
confusion. (See also Ex. 49, Berriochoa Dep. at 90:1-91:15; Ex. 54, Quehring Dep. at 112:23-
116:10, 203:1-208:20, 2·14:8-216:8, 216:19-217:9, 219:17-220:7; Ex. 63, Leigh Dep. at 77: 13-
78:18,79:17-80:9,135:19-136:8, 137:5-19, 140:12-141:24, 147:1-149:12, 151:9'16.) 
Finally, Rosetta Stone has produced to Google the report of Kent D. Van Liere, a Vice 
President at NERA Economic Consulting, who conducts market analysis, sampling analysis, and 
survey research on a wide range of topics regarding consumer decision making, consumer choice 
and consumer behavior. (Ex. 37 at I.) Dr. Van Liere conducted. survey and concluded that ". 
significant portion of consumers in the relevant population are likely to be confused as to the 
origin, sponsorship or approval of the 'sponsored links' that appear on the search results page 
after a consumer has conducted a Google search using a Rosetta Stone trademark as a keyword 
and/or are likely to be confused -as to the affiliation, endorsement, or association of the websites 
linked to those ' sponsored links' with Rosetta Stone." (ld at 2-3.) In panicular, Dr. Van Liere 's 
study "concluded that 17 percent of consumers demonstrate' actual confusion." (Id at 12.) 
A~hough Google 's confusion expert Edward A. Blair has submitted a report and declaration 
which criticize Dr. Van Liere's study, Dr. Blair did not conduct his own study to test the actual 
confusion that arises as a result of Google's practices. in fact, he testified at his deposition in 
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this case that the use of Rosetta Stone's name in the text of another company's Sponsored Link 
would increase. the likelihood of confusion. (Ex. 50, Blair Dep. at 117:12-18.)' 
In short, Rosetta Stone has presented significant evidence of consumer confusion, which 
stands uncontradicted by GoogIe.' 
C Google's Remaining Attempts To Evade Liability For .Direct [ofringement 
Are Unavailing 
In its attempt to avoid straightforward application of the elements of a trademark 
infringement claim, Google presents several arguments that it claims justifY its practices and/or 
render it immune from liability. None of these arguments provides any basis for denying Rosetta 
Stone's motion for summary judgment - much less for granting judgment in Google's favor. 
1. Google's Use Of The Rosetta Stone Marks Is.Actionable 
First, Google argues that the use of the Rosetta Stone Marks to rerer to Rosetta Stone 
products, as a matter of law, is not actionable. (Google Mem. at 8-12.) In so arguing, Google 
spends pages of it, brief explicating the "fundamental pUlpose" of trade marl< law, cit ing dO!Oades-
old cases that stand for propositions that Rosetta Stone does not controvert. (Id at 8-10.) In this 
, 
, 
As explained in Rosetta Stone's opposition to Google's Motion to Exclude Expert' Report 
and Opinion of Dr. Kent Van Liere, there is no basis to exclude Dr. Van Liere's report and 
opinions. To the contrary, Dr. Van Liere's opinions are both relevant and helpful 
Google's assertions that Rosetta Stone's customers are "sophisticated" and that "[t)here is no 
evidence of malicious intent" do not contradict Rosetta Stone's showing of confusion. 
(Google Mem. at 18·20.) In any event, "buyer sophistication will only be a key mctor when 
the relevant market is not the public at-large." Sara Lee, si' F.3d at 461. Here, the relevant 
market is "the public at-large." To the extent that buyer sophistication nevertheless is 
considered, the undisputed facts demonstrate that even "sophisticated" consumers are 
confused by Google's Sponsored Links: indeed, Rosetta Stone deposed five college-
educated consumers who were confused by Google', Sponsored Links and Google's own 
research demonstrates that search engine users are unable to distinguish between Sponsored 
Links and organic results. (See Disputed Fact ~ 4.) As to Google's intent, Google's own 
documents demonstrate that Google knowingly and willfully used the Rosetta Stone Marks in 
a manner that would drive internet traffic away from Rosetta Stone and to the sites of its 
other customers. (Exs. 38-40.) 
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regard, contrary to Google's assertion, Rosetta. Stone does Dot seek «word-monopoly" with 
respect to its trademarks. It simply seeks to prevent Google from selling its Marks to the highest 
bidder and allowing any third party to display a Sponsored Link on the search-results page when 
a usor queries a Rosetta Stone Mark. 
While Googlo contends that its practices "promote the purpose of trademark IaI/J by 
giving consumers information they need to identify products and gather information," (Google 
Mem. at 10), tho actual purpose of Google's AdWords program is to generate income for Google. 
(Exs. 1-3,25-26.) According to internal Google projections in 2008, revenue from Sponsored 
Links was expected to account for 85% of Google's gross revenue. (E,,- 41 at GOOG-RS-
0079233.) Google's most recent Annual Report discloses that Google earned more than $23.65 
billion in gross revenue in 2009. (Ex. 24 at 62.) Thus, the trademark practices that Google touts 
as intended for consumer beneftt in fact result in billions of dollars of revenue for Googlo. 
In fuct, although Google suggests that the only" S~onsored Links that appear on search-
results pages for Rosetta Stone Marks are those that provide consumers information they need to 
identify products and gather information (Google Mem. at 10), Sponsored Links frequently 
contain false and misleading information, . disparaging information and advertisements for 
counterfeiters. (Ex.. 54, Duehring Dep. at 109:25-110:16; ex:. 68, Ramsey Oep. at 198:22-199:17; 
Calhoun Dec!. n 2-10 & Exs. B-D.) AJ discussed above, Google's practice of selling the 
Rosetta Stone Marks as keywords thus has resulted in actual consumer confusion, which is 
precisely what the trademark laws se~k to prevent. 8 
• Because Google's practices result in consumer confusion, Google's relianc~ on cases 
analyzing true comparative advertising is misplaced, (Google Mem. at 11-12.) 
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2. Google's Practices Fall Outside The Scope Of The First'Sale Doclrine 
Google's reliance on the "first sale doctrine" to justify its use of the Rosetta Stone Marks 
is misplaced. (Google Mem. at 10.) That doctrine is based on the premise that "trademark law 
does not apply to the sale of genuine goods bearing a true mark." Shell Oil Co. v. Commercial 
Petroleum, Inc., 928 F.2d 104, 107 (4th Cir. 1991). Thus, "a purchaser who docs no more than 
stock, display, and resell a producer's product under the producer's trademark violates no right 
conferred upon the producer by the Lanham Act." Sebastian Inl'J, Inc. v. Longs Drug Stores 
Corp., 53 F.3d 1073, 1076 (9th Cir. 1995). However, "conduct by the rescUer other than merely 
stocking and reselling genuine trademarked products may be sufficient to support a cause of 
action for infringement" Id Accordingly, the Federal Circuit concluded that a reseller violated 
the Lanham Act where it "used the p[oducer~s trademark in a telephone directory advertisement 
in such a way as to suggest the reseller was one of the producer's franchisees." Id (citing 
Bandag. Inc. v. Al Bolser's Tire Stores, 750 F.2d 903, 9H (Fed. Cir. 1984». Likewise, where a 
rescller "displayed the producer's trademark in the reseller's booth at a trade show and in a trade 
journal advertisement, and stamped t.he reseUer's name on the producer's promotional literature 
and used it to advertise the resale of the producer's products by the reseller," it was held to have 
violated the Lanham Act. '1d (citing Stormor. a Div. of Fuqua Indus. v. Johnson, 587 F. Supp. 
275,279 (W.O. Mich. 1984»). 
Here, Google offers the Rosetta Stone Marks at auction to any third party, whether or not 
a reseller of genuine Rosetta Stone product. (Dkt. 117, Lloyd Decl. Ex- I.) These third parties 
bid on the Rosetta Stone Marks and use the Marks in their Sponsored Link text. Thus, Google 
and its customers do more than "stock, display. and resell" genuine Rosetta Stone product under 
the Rosetta Stone Marks. The first sale doctrine therefore is inapplicable. 
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'3. The Rosetta Stone Marks Are Not Functional 
Google also argues that the use of the Rosetta Stone Marks as keywords is functional and 
therefore not subject to Lanham Act review. (Gcogle Mem. at 13-15.) The functionality. 
doctrine, however, has no application to Google's sale of the Rosetta Stone Marks to third panies. 
As Google states, a product feature is functiooal "if ~ is essential to the use or purpose of the 
article or if it affects the cost or quality ofthe article." (Iii. at 13 (quoting TraffIX Devices. Inc. v. 
Mkt. Displays. Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 32 (2001).) Mar<: specifically, as the.Supreme Court explained 
in another case cited by Google: 
The function.lity doctrine prevents trademark law, which seeks to promote 
competition by protecting a firm's reputation., from instead inhibiting legitimate 
competition by allowing a producer to control a useful product feature. It is the 
province of patent law, not .tradcmark taw, to encourage invention by granting 
inventors a monopoly over new product designs or functions for a limited lime, 35 
U.s.C. §§ 154, 173, after which competitors are free to use the innovation. If the 
product's functional features could be used as trademarks, however, a monopoly 
over such features could be obtained without regard to whether they qualify as 
patents and could be extended forever (because trademarks may be renewed in 
perpetuity). 
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., Inc., 514 U.s. 159, 164-65 (1995) (green-gold color of 
press pads used in dry cleaning and laundry establishments was not functional and met the basic 
legal requirements for use as a trademark). 
So, for example, in TrafflX, the Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiffs dual-spring 
design for road signs was functional - it provided. a "unique and useful mechanism to resist the 
force of the wind" - and therefore was not entitled to trade dress protection. 523 u.s. at 33-34. 
Likewise, in Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc .• the court found that an initialization code was a 
functional feature that must be included in a video game program in order for the game to 
operate on plaintiffs video game system and that defendant therefore could not be barred from 
using the code in manufacturing video games ror plaintiffs video game system 977 F.2d 1510, 
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1530-31 (9th Cir. 1993); see also Compaq Computer Corp. v. Procom Tech., Inc., 908 F. Supp. 
1409, 1423 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (use of plaintiff's mark in vendor 1D portion of drive's firmware 
was functional and not entitled to trademark protection). And in Valu Eng'g, Inc. v. Rexnord 
Corp., applicant's cross-sectional designs of conveyor guide rails were found to be functional 
and thus not subject to trademark protection. 278 F.3d 1268, 1279 (Fed. C;:ir. 2002). 
Here. the Rosetta Stone Marks are not functional as they are not essential to the use or 
purpose of Rosetta Stone's products aad they do not affect the cost or quality of those products. 
The funttionality doctrine therefore is inapplicable. In relying on the functionality doctrine, 
Google turns the doctrine on its head - arguing that because Google '$ product operates better by 
using trademarks as keywords, its "use of Rosetta Stone's marks as keyword triggers is therefore 
a non-infringing, functional use." (Goog1e Mem. at 15.) Google's argument also ignorcs the 
fact that, after years of prohibiting the use of trademarks as keyword triggers, Google began 
selling trademarks as keyword triggers because of the "[slignificant potential revenue impact." 
(Ex. 42 at GOOG-RS-0068600.) Thus, it is the goodwill associated with the trademarks 
themselves - not any functionality that they provide - that males their use by Google lucrative. 
Neither the functionality doctrine nor any case that Google cites supports the claim that such use 
falls within the purview of the functiofll";ly doctrine. Google's functionality argument therefore 
should be rejected. See Playboy Emers., Inc. v. Ne/scape Commc'ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1031 
(9th Cu. 2004) (finding that functionality doctrine has no application to defendant search engine 
operators' use of plaintiff's trademarks: "[tlh. fact that the marks make defendants' computer 
program more functional is irrelevant,,}.9 
, 
Even if the functionality doctrine were applicable, "[tlhe question whether a product feature 
is functional is. question of fact." Sega, 977 F.2d at 1530 (citing Inwood lAbs., Inc. Y. Ives 
lAbs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 835 (1982». 
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4, Google Uses The Rosetta Stone Marks In Ad Text 
Finally, Google argues that it cannot be held directly liable for third-party use of the 
Rosetta Stone Marks in Sponsored Links because "Google does not determine the content of the 
ads; it merely publishes them." (ld. at 15.) Numerous Google documents, however, demonstrate 
Google's involvement in the development of Sponsored Link text, including Googl.'s 
recorrunendation that customers feature trademarks in text. For example, in "optimiza~ionn tips 
offered to AdWords customers, Google recorrunends that customers "put the keywords that 
trigger the ad in the ad's headline and description. This lets OU[ users know that your site is 
relevant to their search query." (Ex. 43 .) In addit ion, Google recommends that customers 
"highlight[] the brand name . . . in the display URI." portion of the ad text. (Ex. 44.) Google 
also advises its customers: "When a user sees an ad with the same term th~y searched for, they'll 
be more likely to click the ad." (ld.) Indeed, Google touts in its IO-K that its "AdWords 
specialists help advertisers select relevant keywords and create more effective ads." (Ex. 24 at 
lO.) Google also has ultimate control over the content of Sponsored Links displayed on its 
search-results pages. (Ex. 21.) Thus, contrary to Google's assertions, Googie is not merely a 
publisher of text provided by its customers, Google is an active participant in the development of 
tho Sponsored Links." 
In short. Rosetta Stone has proved direct trademark infringement. Google's motion for 
summary judgment must be denied. 
10 Google's involvement in this process in not surprising given GoogJe's business model. As 
Ooogle readily acknowledges, Google does not get paid when a Sponsored Link is shown on 
a search-results page. It is paid on a "cost-per-click" basis. When a GoogJe user "clicks" on 
a Sponsored Link in Google 's search results page, the advertiser pays Google fur the click. 
(DkL 142, Stipulation of Uncontested Facts y 11.) Thus, it is in Google's economic interest 
to assist its advertisers in developing .text that is likely to lead a user to click on the 
Sponsored Link. 
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n. ROSETTA STONE HAS PROVED SECONDARY TRADEMARK LIABILITY 
Rosetta Stone also has demonstrated Google's liability for the trademark infringement of 
its customers. As Google acknowledges, to prove contributory infringement, Rosetta Stone must 
prove that Google "intentionally induces another to infringe" or "continues to supply its product 
to one whom it knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement." (Google 
Mem. at 23-24 (quoting Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Iv,,", Labs .• Inc .• 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982)).) To 
prove vicarious infringement, Rosetta Stone must prove that Google and its customers controlled 
the appearance of the Sponsored Links on Google's search-results pages and the use of Rosetta 
Stone's trademarks therein. GEICO v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 705 (E.D. Va. 2004); 
see also Perfect 10. Inc. v. A.mazon.com. Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1173 (9th Cir. 2007). .'ul 
demonstrated in Rosetta Stone's motion for partial summary judgment, the undisputed facts 
support liability on all of these bases. (Rosetta Stone Mem. at 24-27.) 
A. Google Is Liable For Contributory Infringement 
Google does not even address the ftrst way to establish contributory infringement - i.e., 
intentionally inducing others to infringe. Google simply says that it does not do so. (Google 
Mem. .t 24.) As demonstrated in Rosetta Stone's motion, however, the record contains 
undisputed evidence th.t Gongle intentionally induces customers to bid on trademarked terms .s 
keyword triggers .nd to use trademarked terms in the text and title of their Sponsored Links. 
Such conduct constitutes intentional inducement. See Bauer Lafnp Co., Inc. v. Shaffer, 941 F.2d 
1165 (11th Cir. 1991) (defendant s.les representatives who asked lamp manufacturer to produce 
infringing lamps held liable for contributory trade dress infringement); Transdermal Prods .• Inc. 
Y. Performance Contract Packaging. Inc., 943 F. Supp. 551,553 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (finding th.t a 
contributory infringement claim could be made against a retailidistributDr who knowingly 
selected plaintiffs mark and who encouraged . manufacturer to copy plaintiff's mark). 
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In arguing that it is not responsible for the trademark infringement ofits customers under 
the second prong of the contributory infringement standard, Google relies on the district court 
opinion in Tiffany Inc. v. eBay, 111c., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 469 (S.D.N. Y. 2008). (Googlo Mem 
at 24.) Last week, the Second Circuit affirmed that decision in relevant part in an opinion that 
makes cl""r that Google is responsible for the trademark infringement of its customers here. In 
this regard, the Second Circuit's conclusion that eBay was not contributorily liable for the sale of 
counterfeit Tiffany products on its website turned on the' fuct that Tiffany "failed to demonstrate 
that eBay was supplying its service to individuals who it knew or had reason to know were 
selling counterreit Tiffany goods." Tiffany Inc. v. eBay, Inc., - F.3d -, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 
6735, at +41 (Apr. 1,2010). Here, in contrast, Rosetta Stone has demonstrated that Google was 
selling the Rosetta Stone Marks as keywords to individuals who it knew or had reason to know 
were selling counterfeit Rosetta Stone goods. 
Specifically, the declaration of Jason Calhoun, submitted in support of Rosetta Stone's 
motion for partial summary judgment, demonstrates that during the period September 2009 to the 
present, Rosetta Stone repeatedly contacted Google to request that specific Sponsored Links be 
taken down on the basis that. the sites to which Google was directing traffic were selling 
counterfeit Rosetta Stone software. Between September 3, 2009 and March I, 2010, Rosetta 
Stone notified Google of nearly 200 instances of Sponsored Links to counterfeit web sites. (Dk!. 
106.) Attached to Mr. Calhoun's declaration was a spreadsheet reflecting the dates upon which 
Rosetta Stone found a counterfeit Sponsored Link on Google, tbe dates upon which Rosetta 
Stone advised Google that the Sponsored Link was fraudulen~ the domain names associated with 
each such Sponsored Link, the text of each such Sponsored Link, and the date and substance of 
Google's response. (Iii) This spreadsheet demonstrates that Google continued to auction the 
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Rosetta Stone Marks to the same customers after Rosetta Stone had advised Google that the 
customers were selling counterfeit product. 
For example, on November 16, 2009, Rosetta Stone advised Google that 
gainsoftmall.comlrosettastoneColorado was infringing Rosetta Stone's marks. (See Calhoun Ex. 
D-79.) On that same day, Google advised Rosetta Stone that it had taken the infringing Link 
down. ([d) On November 17, 2009, however, Google again allowed 
gainsoftmall.comlrosettastoneColorado to place an infringing Sponsored Link on a search-results 
page for a Rosetta Stone mark. (See id Ex. D-76.) Rosetta Stone again advised Google of the 
infringing Sponsored Link and, on November 18,2009, Google advised Rosetta Stone that it had 
taken the infringing Link down. (See ido) Then, on November 19, 2009, Google again allowed 
gainsofimall.comlrosettastone to place an infringing Sponsored Link on a search-results page fur 
a Rosetta Stone mark. (See id. Ex. D-74.) These facts establish that Google was supplying its 
service to individuals who it knew were selling counterfeit Rosetta Stone goods. 
Google's own documents, moreover, confirm this fact. On September 15,2009, Rosetta 
Stone notified Google via email that Sponsored Links for pirated Rosetta Stone software were 
appearing on results pages for searches of "Rosetta Stone," among othcr · tcrms~ and requested 
that Google take tbe Links dOWIL One Link was for the webSite hotmallstore.com and read: 
Learn Spanish _ - $139 
Only $139, Free & Fast Shipping 
Buy Rosetta Now! 
hotmallstore.comIRosetta_Stone 
(Ex. 45 at GOOG-RS-0310714-0310715.) On September. 15, 2009, Google responded that all of 
the Links identified in Rosetta Stone's September 15 email".,e now down." (ld. at GOOG-RS-
0310714.) On September 16,2009, Rosetta Stone notified Google via email that more Links for 
pirated Rosetta Stone software were appearing on Google results pages for searches of '~osetta 
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L 
Stone" and requesled that Goegle take the Links down. One Link was for the website 
hOlmartforyou.com, which Rosetta Stone stated was "exactly like the other DVD sites you 
previously removed." The Link for hotmartforyou.com was nearly identical to the Link for 
hotmallstore.com: 
Learn Spanish _ - $139 
Only $139, Free & Fast Shipping 
Buy Language Soft Now! 
hotmartforyou.comiRosetta _Stone 
(ld. at GOOG-RS-03!0711-0310712.) On September 16,2009, Google responded that the 
Links identified in Rosetta Stone's September 16 email have.been .. taken . .. down ... ([d.at 
GOOG-RS-0310711.) On September 17,2009, Rosetta Stone notified Google via email that 
more Links for pirated Rosetta Stone software were appearing on Google results pages for 
searches of ('Rosetta Stone" and requested that Google take the Links down. Rosetta Stone 
stated that the websites for these Links were the "[sJame as the DVD sites you previously 
removed." One Link was for the website hotmall2u.com and was nearly identical to the Links 
for hotmaIisto[c.com and hotmartforvou.com: 
Learn Spanish _ - $139 
Only $139, Free & Fast Shipping 
Buy Rosetta Now! 
hotma1l2u.comlRosetta _Stone 
([d. al GOOG-RS-0310708-0310709.)" Publicly available domain regL,tralion information for 
hotmal12u.com hotmailsrore.com and hotmartforyou.com shows that they are all registered to an 
individual with the email address zfXabe@gmaiLcom. (Ex. 46 at GOOG-RS-0336250.)12 
11 In sharp contrast to the specific notice provided by Rosena Stone to Google, Tiffany's 
demand letters to eBay "did not identify particular sellers who Tiffany thought were then 
offering or would offer counterfeit goods." Tiffany, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 6735, at *41. 
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Even after being notified that these w~bsiles were selling counterfeit Rosetta Stone 
software, Google continued to allow Sponsored Links fur other websites owned by the same 
person to use Rosetta Stone Marks as keyword triggers and in text. During the throe-month 
period October 2009 through December 2009, Google allowed 110 different Sponsored Links 
purportedly seIling Rosetta Stone software to use "Rosetta Stone" as a keyword trigger, even 
though all the Links were linked to websites that also are registered to an individunl with the 
email addresszfXabe@gmail.com. (Jd.; Ex. 47.) Most of the 110 Sponsored Links included 
"Rosetta Stone" or "Rosettastone" in their display URLs. (Ex.47.) Between October 2009 and 
December 2009, Google displayed these 110 Sponsored Links keyword-triggered to "Rosetta 
Stone" on a total of356,675 different search-results pages. (Id.) 
This record evidence thus contradicts Google's assertion that "[tJhe undisputed evidence 
shows that if an advertiser breaches its contractual obligations to Google by advertising a 
couhterreit Rosetta Stone product, upon receiving notification of the ad's questionable status, 
Google acts promptly to ensure that it does not 'continue[] to supply its product' to that 
advertiser." (Google Mern. at 24 (citations omitted).) Because Google continued 10 supply its 
product to known infringers, Google is liable for contributory infringement. 
B. . Google Is Liable For Vicariouslnfringeme6t 
With respect to vicarious infringement, Google argues only that il lacks an agency 
relationship with its AdWords customers and therefure cannot be held liable for the conduct of 
the customers. (GoogIe Mern. at 25.) In so arguing, Google too narrowly construes vicarious 
infringement. Vicarious liability arises not only when an agency relationship exists but also 
(cont 'd from previous page) 
1 Consistent with Google's advice that customers "highlightO tbe brand name .. . in the 
display URL" portion of the ad text, all three of the foregoing Sponsored Links included 
Rosetta Stone in their displayURLs. (Spaziano Ex. 44.) 
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when thc udefendant and the infringer 'exercise joint ownership and control over the infringing 
product.'" GEICO, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 705. Thus, Judge Brinkerna denied Google ' s mot ion to 
dismiss GEICO's vicarious infringement claim where GEICO aUeged that Googi. controls the 
appearance of the Sponsored Links that appear on its search-results pages and the use of 
GEICO's marks therein. !d. Here, the undisputed mets demonstrate that· Google control, both 
the appearance of the Sponsored Links that appear on its search-results pages and the use of the 
Rosetta Stone Marks in those Links. (See Disputed Fact ~ S, § LCA.) Accordingly, Google is 
liable to Rosetta Stone for vicarious infringement as well. I] 
ID. ROSETI' A STONE HAS PROVED TRADEMARK DILUTION 
To prove a dilution claim, Rosetta Stone must demonstrate (I) that it owns a famous 
mark that is distinctive; (2) that Google has commenced using a mark in commerce that allegedly 
is diluting Rosetta Stone's famous mark; (3) that a similarity between Google's mark and Rosetta 
Stone's famous mark gives rise to an association between the marks; and (4) that the association 
is likely to impair the distinctiveness of the famous mark or likely to harm the reputation of the 
famous mark. Louis Vuitlon Malletier s.A. v. HOUle Diggity Dog. LLC,.507 F.3d 252, 264-65 
(4th Cir. 2007);. see also IS U.S.c. § I I 25(c)(1) (2006). The undisputed mcts demonstrate that 
Rosetta Stone is entitled to sunimary judgment as to liability o~ its dilution claim. (Rosetta 
Stone Mem. at 27-29.) 
Google concedes - as it must - that the Rosetta Stone marks are famous today - with 
brand awareness of greater than 75% and with 95% of people who are aware of the Rosetta 
" Because the test for trademark infringement under the Lanham Act is essentially the same as 
that for common law trademark infringement and unfair competition under Virginia law, 
Rosetta Stone also is entitled to swrunary judgment on its COlnrnon law infringement and 
unfair competition claims. See Lone Star Sicakhouse & Saloon. Inc. v. Alpha of Va., Inc., 43 
F.3d 922, 930 n. IO (4th Cir. 1995). 
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Stone brand considering it the top language learning choice. (Google Mem. at 27.)14 Google 
nevertheless argues that it cannot be held liable for diluting the Rosetta Stone Marks because 
"Rosetta Stone" was not a famous mark in 2004. (See Google Mem. at 26-27.) Basically, 
Google argues that because "Rosetta Stone" had not achieved general rame in April 2004 when 
Google started its practice of seUing trademarks to the highest bidder, it is'not liable to Rosetta 
Stone for the blurring and tamishment of the Rosetta Stone Marks that result from Google's 
practices today. (See id) Google's argument is factually and legally unsound. 
As a factual matter, "Rosetta Stone" was a famous mark in 2004. (See Rosetta Stone 
Mem. at 27-29 & UF 1-4 & 8.) As a legal matter, this case does not involve a situation where 
the defendant is using a mark similar to the piaintitrs mark on its O'W7J goods - the situation 
underlying all the cases cited by Google." Rather, this case involves Google's sale of the 
" Louis Vuilton, 507 F.3d at 265 (Louis Vuitton's LVM mark is famous); Volkswagen. AG v. 
VolkswagentolkCom, 584 F. Supp. 2d 879 (E.D. Va. 2008) (Volkswagen is famous); 
Graduate Mgml. Admission Council v. Raju, 267 F. Supp. 2d 505 (E.D. Va. 2003) (GMA T is 
famous); Intermatic Inc. v.' Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1239 (N.D. III. 1996) 
(lNTERMA TIC is famous); Panavision Inl'J L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296, 1302 (C.D. 
Cal. 1996) (PANAVISION is famous); WAWA Dairy Farms v, Hoof, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1629, 1631 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (WAWA is famous), offd, 1I6 FJd 471 (3d Cir. 1997). 
" The Network Ne;'oTk v. CBS, Inc., No. 98-1349 NM (M'X), 2000 WL 362016, 'at "3 (C.D. · 
Cal. Jan. 18, 2000) (plaintiff used "TNN" as service mark for computer network consulting 
company while defendant used "TNN" as service mark for "The Nashville Network" cable 
television network); TOTO Co. v. ToraHead Inc., No. 114,06I, 2001 WL 1734485 (TT.A.B. 
Dec. 12, 2001) (applicant sought to register the mark ''ToroMR'' for magnetic reading and 
writing heads while opposer used mark "TORO" on a variety of goods and services); TCPlP 
Holding Co .. Inc. v. Haar Commc 'ns. Inc., 244 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2001) (plaintiff used "The 
Children's Place" as trademark for children's clothing store while defendant registered the 
domain name "thechildrensplace.com" as webpage that would facilitate surfing the web for 
materials concerning children); Bd. of Regents, Univ. of Texas Sys. ex rei. Univ. of Texas a/ 
Auslin v. KST Elec .. Ltd, 550 F. Supp. 2d 657 (W.D. Tex- 2008) (plaintiff used longhorn 
silhouette logo to refer to its university mascot while defendant used longhorn silhouette logo 
to refer to its electric company). 
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Rosetta Stone Marks themselves. Given that Google uses the Rosetta Stone Marks because they 
are famous, its attempt to avoid liability based on the date the Marks became famous is untenable. 
'Google's attempt to avoid liability by claiming that there is no evidence of likely 
"damage" to the Rosetta Stone Marks given the current strength of the Marks is equally baseless. 
(See Google Mem. at 27.) Damage is not an clement of a dilution claim; rather, Rosetta Stone 
must show that Google's use or the Marks is likely to impair the distinctiveness of or harm the 
reputation of the Rosetta Stone Marks. Courts routinely have found dilution by blurring where, 
as here, the defendant has used the plaintiff's actual mark. See, e.g., Diane von Furstenberg 
Studio v. Snyder, No. 1 :06cv 1356(JCC), 2007 WL 2688184, at *4 (E.D. Va. Sept 10, 2007) 
(granting plaintiff summary judgment on its dilution claim where the defendant used the 
identical mark); PETA v. Doughney, 113 F. Supp. 2d 915, 920 (E.D. Va. 2000), affd, 263 P.3d 
359 (4th Cir. 2001) (sarne). Likewise, courts routinely have found dilution by !amishment where, 
as here, the plaintiffs mark has been linked to counterfeit products. See, e.g., Diane von 
Furstenberg StudiO, 2007 WL 2688184, at *4 (fmding tamishment); Am. Online, Inc. v. LCGM, 
Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 444,450 (E.D. Va. 1998) (finding tami,hment). For these reasons, Rosetta 
Stone - not Google - is entitled to summary judgment on its trademark dilution claim. 
IV. ROSETTA STONE HAS PROVED UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
Under Virginia Jaw, n plaintiff seeking recovery for unjust enrichment must show ( I) that 
it "conferred" a benefit On the defendant, (2) that the defendarit knew of the benefit and should 
reasonably have expected to repay the plaintiff. and (3) that the defendant accepted or retained 
the benefit without paying for its value. Nosse. v. Hoy, 750 F. Supp. 740, 744-45 (E.D. Va. 
1990). Judge Davis recently explained that the word "conferred" in this conte~ includes 
situations in which the defendant, without authorization, takes a benefit from the plaintiff even 
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when the plaintiff has not voluntarily bestowed the benefit on the defendant. See In re Bay Vista 
a/Va .. Inc .• No. 2:09cv46, 2009 WL 2900040, at oS (E.D. Va. June 2,2009). 
Google argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because there is no record evidence 
that Google promised to pay for the use of the Rosetta Stone Marks. (Googlo Mem. at 28.) The 
promise to pay. however, "is implied from the I?Onsideration received." Appletan v. Bondurant 
& Appleton, P.e., 67 Va. Cir. 95,2005 WL 517491, at °6 010. Cir. Ct. 2005) (citations omitted); 
see also Po River Water and Sewer Co. v. Indian Acres Club a/Thornburg. Inc .. 255 Va. 108, 
114-15 (1998). Here, the undisputed fuets demonstrate that Gongle accepted, or took without 
autharization, the Rosetta Stone Marks and made them available to third parties at auctions 
hosted by Google. It is also undisputed that Google derived considerable profits from the 
unauthorized auction of the Rosetta Stone Marks. The promise to pay for this benefit is implied 
in law from the unauthorized taking and subsequent sale of the Rosetta Stone MDrks. 
Google also argues that Rosetta Stone's unjust enrichment claim fails because Goog'" 
and Rosetta Stone have an enforceable contract governing Rosetta Stone·s purchase of 
Sponsored Links. (Google Mem. at 27-28.) However, an express contract will preclude an 
unjust enrichment claim only where the express contract governs the "same subject matter" that 
gives risc to the unjust enrichment claim. Appleton. 2005 WL 517491, .C*6 (quoting S. Biscuit 
Co. v. Lloyd, 174 Va. 299, 311 .(1940) ("an express contract defining the rights of the parties 
necessarily precludes the existence of an implied contract or' a different nature containing the 
Some subject mailer"}) (emphasis added). Here, there is no contract between Goog1e and Rosetta 
Slone that governs or even addresses Google ' s right to auction Rosetta Stone's trademarks to 
third parties. The contract between Google and Rosetta Stone merely delineated what Rosetta 
Stone agreed to pay to Google for Rosetta StoDe's Sponsored Links. It cannot be construed as an 
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1 
express contract between Google and Rosetta Stone governing Google's rights and obligations 
vis-a-vis third parties and its AdWords auctions. 
V. GOOGLE IS NOT AN INNOCENT PUBLISHER 
In the last section of its summary judgment brief, Google argues that Rosetta Stone's 
remedies against Google for direct infringement are limited by the inpocent publisher rule. 
(Google Mem. at 28-29.) This rule, however, has no application to the fuets of this case. It 
provides, in relevant part: 
Where the infringement or violation complained of is contained in or i.s part of 
paid advertising matter in a newspaper, magazine, or other similar periodical or in 
an electronic communication . . ", the remedies of the owner of the right infringed 
or person bringing the action . . . as' against the publisher or distributor of such. 
newspaper, magazine, or other similar -periodical or electronic communication 
shall be limited to an injunction against the presentation of such advertising 
matter in future issues of such newspapers, magazines, or other similar periodicals 
or in futu're transmissions of ruch electronic communications. The limitations of 
this subparagraph shall apply only to innocent infringers and innocent violators. 
15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(B). Here, Google is not merely the "publisher" or "distributor" of the 
Sponsored Links - it creates the opportunity for infringement by allowing third parties to bid on 
the Rosetta Stone Marks' as keywords to trigger Sponsored Links, it increases the likelihood of 
consumer confusion by allowing third parties to use the Rosetta Stone Marks in the text of 
Sponsored Links, i~ encourages customers to bid on trademarks as keyword triggers and it 
encourages customers to use trademarks in Sponsored Link text. Google thus is an active 
participant in [he infringement at issue and cannot claim protection as a mere publisher. 
In any event, Google is not an "innocene' infringer. Relying on an unpublished decision 
from tI,e Northern District of Illinois, Google asserts that a defendant is an innocent infringer 
unless it had actual knowledge that the ads were infringing or recklessly disregarded a high 
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probability that the ads infringed the plaintifrs rights. (Google Mem. at 28.)16 Assuming. 
arguendo that this Circuit would adopt the stringent standard adopted by the Northern District of 
Illinois, Google still would not be deemed an innocent infringer. Contrary to Google's assertion, 
there is irrefutable evidence that Google had actual knowledge that the Sponsored Links it 
displayed were infringing. (See Section II.A., supra.) 
Even if Google couid avail itself of the "innocent infringer" rule, Google is incorrect in 
its assertion that "injunctive relief may not be imposed here." (Google Mem. at 29.) In 
Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., the case on which. Google relies for this proposition, the court 
concluded . that injunctive relief was not appropriate because (i) eBay represented that it had 
stopped running all the advertisements claimed to be infringing and that it had no intention of 
running the identified advertisements in the future~ (ii) eBay's evidence showed that it had 
removed from its website the aUegedly false and misleading advertisements at issue in the case; 
and (iii) the plaintiff had offered no evidence that coJ!lradicted this showing. 165 F. Supp. 2d 
1082, 1095 (C.D. Cal. 2001). No such evidence has been presented here. To the contrary, 
0og1e continues to allow its customers to bid on the Rosetta Stone Marks and it continues to 
allow customers to use the Rosetta Stone Marks in ad text while performing virtually no due 
diligence regarding whether such customers may be selling counterfeit versions 'Of the goods 
before allowing them to use the trademarks in Sponsored Link text." 
16 Notably, the Fifth Circuit - the only appellate CQurt to have addresoed the innocent publisher 
defense in the trademark context - has rejected this interpretation, finding that an objective 
reasonableness standard applies. See Dial One of the Mid-South, Inc. v. Bel/South 
Telecommc'ns, Inc., 269 F.3d 523, 526-27 (5th Cir. 2001) (afikming district court's 
conclusion that defendant's failure to remove infringing mark from phone books was not 
objectively reasonable). , 
J7 Google's self-serving assertion that it "has implemented reasonable measures aimed at 
limiting the display of ads for potentially counterfeit products," (Goog!e Mem. at 29), is 
(CON 'd) 
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For all these reasons, the innocent publisher rule has no application here and Rosetta 
Stone·s remedies are not limited in any respect. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Rosetta Stone respectfully requests that this Court deny 
Google's motion for summary judgment and grant Rosetta Stone's motion for partial sununary 
judgment as to liability on all its federal and state law claims. 
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belied by the facts. Google does not follow its own "standard investigative practice" for 
checking a website to determine if it may be offering counterfeit goods for sale. (Ex. 65, 
Louis Dep. at 25:12-26:20.) Instead, Google merely looks for the presence of certain words 
or phrases, such as "faux" or "counterfeit," in the Sponsored Link text and on the advertiser's 
website. (Ex. 60, Hagan Dep. at 87:13·88:9,1 57:2-12 & 158:21-159:17; Ex . 65, Lloyd Dep. 
at 63: 10-65:9; Ex. 57, Gultekin Dep. at 21 :20-22: 11 & 170:9-172:1 L) 
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